ValidKI: A Method for Designing Indicators to Monitor the Fulfillment of Business Objectives with Particular Focus on Quality and ICT-supported Monitoring of Indicators by Olav, Skjelkvåle Ligaarden et al.
 
SINTEF ICT 
Networked Systems and Services 
2012-10-01 
 SINTEF A23413- Unrestricted 
 
Report 
ValidKI: A Method for Designing Indicators 
to Monitor the Fulfillment of Business 
Objectives with Particular Focus on Quality 














II Basic terminology and definitions 5
II-A The artifacts addressed by ValidKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II-B The models/descriptions developed by ValidKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II-C Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III Overview of ValidKI 7
III-A Establish target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III-B Identify risks to fulfillment of business objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
III-C Identify key indicators to monitor risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III-D Evaluate internal validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III-E Specify key indicator designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
III-F Evaluate construct validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
IV Establish target 9
IV-A Express business objectives more precisely (Step 1.1 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IV-B Describe relevant part of business (Step 1.2 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
V Identify risks to fulfillment of business objective 13
V-A Specify risk acceptance criteria (Step 2.1 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
V-B Risk identification and estimation (Step 2.2 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
V-C Risk evaluation (Step 2.3 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
VI Identify key indicators to monitor risks 19
VI-A Deploy sensors to monitor risks (Step 3.1 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
VI-B Specify requirements to key indicators wrt deployed sensors (Step 3.2 of ValidKI) . . . . . 21
VII Evaluate internal validity 23
VII-A Express business objective in terms of key indicators (Step 4.1 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . 23
VII-B Evaluate criteria for internal validity (Step 4.2 of ValidKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VIII Specify key indicator designs 25
VIII-A Key indicator designs for KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
VIII-B Key indicator designs for KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VIII-C Key indicator designs for KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . 28
VIII-D Key indicator designs for KSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VIII-E Key indicator designs for KHSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
VIII-F Key indicator designs for KILL-ACC-SC and its basic key indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
IX Evaluate construct validity 38




ValidKI: A Method for Designing Indicators to
Monitor the Fulfillment of Business Objectives with
Particular Focus on Quality and ICT-supported
Monitoring of Indicators
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Abstract
In this report we present our method ValidKI for designing indicators to monitor the fulfillment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators. A set of indicators is valid
with respect to a business objective if it measures the degree to which the business or relevant part thereof fulfills
the business objective. ValidKI consists of six main steps. We demonstrate the method on an example case focusing
on the use of electronic patient records in a hospital environment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s companies benefit greatly from ICT-supported business processes, as well as business intelligence and
business process intelligence applications monitoring and analyzing different aspects of a business and its processes.
The output from these applications may be indicators which summarize large amounts of data into single numbers.
Indicators can be used to evaluate how successful a company is with respect to specific business objectives. For
this to be possible it is important that the indicators are valid. A set of indicators is valid with respect to a business
objective if it measures the degree to which the business or relevant part thereof fulfills the business objective. Valid
indicators facilitate decision making, while invalid indicators may lead to bad business decisions, which again may
greatly harm the company.
In today’s business environment, companies cooperate across company borders. Such co-operations often result
in sharing or outsourcing of ICT-supported business processes. One example is the interconnected electronic patient
record (EPR) infrastructure. The common goal for this infrastructure is the exchange of EPRs facilitating the
treatment of the same patient at more than one hospital. In such an infrastructure, it is important to monitor the
use of EPRs in order to detect and avoid misuse. This may be achieved through the use of indicators. It may be
challenging to identify and compute good indicators that are valid with respect to business objectives that focus
on quality in general and security in particular. Furthermore, in an infrastructure or system stretching across many
companies we often have different degrees of visibility into how the cooperating parties perform their part of the
business relationship, making the calculation of indicators particularly hard.
In [1] we presented the method ValidKI (Valid Key Indicators) for designing indicators to monitor the fulfillment of
business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators. ValidKI facilitates
the design of a set of indicators that is valid with respect to a business objective. In this report we present an
improved version of the method.
We demonstrate ValidKI by applying it on an example case targeting the use of EPRs. We have developed













Fig. 1. The artifacts addressed by ValidKI
• Business focus: The method should facilitate the design and assessment of indicators for the purpose of
measuring the fulfillment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring
of indicators.
• Efficiency: The method should be time and resource efficient.
• Generality: The method should be able to support the design and assessment of indicators based on data from
systems that are controlled and operated by different companies or organizations.
• Heterogeneity: The method should not place restrictions on how indicators are designed.
The rest of the report is structured as follows: in Section II we introduce our basic terminology and definitions.
In Section III we give an overview of ValidKI and its six main steps. In Sections IV – IX we demonstrate our
six-step method on an example case addressing the use of EPRs in a hospital environment. In Section X we present
related work, while in Section XI we conclude by characterizing our contribution and discussing the suitability of
our method.
II. BASIC TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
Hammond et al. defines indicator as “something that provides a clue to a matter of larger significance or makes
perceptible a trend or phenomenon that is not immediately detectable” [2]. For example, a drop in barometric
pressure may signal a coming storm, while an unexpected rise in the traffic load of a web server may signal a
denial of service attack in progress. Thus, the significance of an indicator extends beyond what is actually measured
to a larger phenomenon of interest.
Indicators are closely related to metrics. ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765 [3] defines metric as “a quantitative measure
of the degree to which a system, component, or process possesses a given attribute,” while it defines attribute as
“the specific characteristic of the entity being measured.” For the web server mentioned above, an example of an
attribute may be availability. An availability metric may again act as an indicator for denial of service attacks, if
we compare the metric with a baseline or expected result [4]. As we can see, metrics are not that different from
indicators. For that reason, indicators and metrics are often used interchangeably in the literature.
Many companies profit considerably from the use of indicators [5] resulting from business process intelligence
applications that monitor and analyze different aspects of a business and its processes. Indicators can be used
to measure to what degree a company fulfills its business objectives and we then speak of key indicators. Some
business objectives may focus on business performance, while others may focus on risk or compliance with laws
and regulations. We will in the remainder of the report refer to indicators as key indicators, since we focus on
indicators in the context of business objectives.
A. The artifacts addressed by ValidKI
The UML [6] class diagram in Fig. 1 relates the main artifacts addressed by ValidKI. The associations between
the different concepts have cardinalities that specify how many instances of one concept that may be associated to
an instance of the other concept.
As characterized by the diagram, one or more key indicators are used to measure to what extent a business
objective is fulfilled with respect to a relevant part of the business. Each key indicator is calculated based on data
provided by one or more sensors. The sensors gather data from the relevant part of the business. A sensor may
gather data for more than one key indicator.
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Specification of relevant part of business
Key indicator
Business objective
Relevant part of business
Artifacts Models/Descriptions
Precise business objective
Sensor Sensor deployment specification
Key indicator requirements specification
Key indicator design specification
Risk acceptance criteria
Model capturing risk to fulfillment of precise business objective
Reformulated precise business objective
Model capturing risk to correctness of reformulated precise business objective
Fig. 2. The models/descriptions developed by ValidKI
B. The models/descriptions developed by ValidKI
As illustrated by Fig. 2, performing the steps of ValidKI results in nine different models/descriptions each of
which describes one of the artifacts of Fig. 1 from a certain perspective.
A specification, at a suitable level of abstraction, documents the relevant part of the business in question.
Business objectives are typically expressed at an enterprise level and in such a way that they can easily be
understood by for example shareholders, board members, partners, etc. It is therefore often not completely clear
what it means to fulfill them. This motivates the need to capture each business objective more precisely.
The fulfillment of a precise business objective may be affected by a number of risks. We therefore conduct a
risk analysis to capture risk to the fulfillment of the precise business objective. To evaluate which risks that are
acceptable and not acceptable with respect to the fulfillment of the precise business objective, we use risk acceptance
criteria. It is the risks that are not acceptable that we need to monitor. The acceptable risks may be thought of
to represent uncertainty we can live with. In other words, their potential occurrences are not seen to significantly
influence the fulfillment of the business objective.
The degree of fulfillment of a precise business objective is measured by a set of key indicators. To measure
its degree of fulfillment there is a need to express each precise business objective in terms of key indicators.
We refer to this reformulation as the reformulated precise business objective. Moreover, the correctness of key
indicators will be affected if they are not implemented correctly. This may again lead to new unacceptable risks
that affect the fulfillment of the precise business objective. Since the reformulated precise business objective is the
precise business objective expressed in terms of key indicators, we need to analyze risks to the correctness of the
reformulated precise business objective.
The computation of key indicators relies on different kinds of data. To collect the data, sensors need to be
deployed in the relevant part of business. Thus, there is a need to specify the deployment of different sensors.
For each key indicator we distinguish between two specifications: the key indicator requirements specification
and the key indicator design specification. The first captures requirements to a key indicator with respect to the
sensor deployment specifications, while the second defines how the key indicator should be calculated.
C. Validity
ISO/IEC 9126 defines validation as “confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the require-
ments for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled” [7]. Since an indicator is basically a metric that
can be compared to a baseline/expected result, the field of metric validation is highly relevant. There is however no
agreement upon what constitutes a valid metric [8]. In [8], Meneely et al. present a systematic literature review of
papers focusing on validation of software engineering metrics. The literature review began with 2288 papers, which
were later reduced to 20 papers. From these 20 papers, the authors extracted and categorized 47 unique validation
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Output: A set of key indicators and a report arguing its validity 
with respect to the business objective received as input
Fig. 3. Overview of ValidKI
criteria. The authors argue that metric researchers and developers should select criteria based on the intended usage
of the metric. Even though the focus in [8] is on validation of software engineering metrics, a number of the
validation criteria presented are general, thus not specific to software engineering. In particular, following [8] we
define a set of key indicators to be valid with respect to a business objective if it is valid in the following two
ways:
1) internal validity – the precise business objective expressed in terms of the key indicators correctly measures
the degree to which the business objective is fulfilled; and
2) construct validity – the gathering of the sensor measurements of each key indicator is suitable with respect
to its requirements specification.
III. OVERVIEW OF VALIDKI
Fig. 3 provides an overview of the ValidKI method. It takes as input a business objective and delivers a set
of key indicators and a report arguing its validity with respect to the business objective received as input. When
using ValidKI in practice we will typically develop key indicators for a set of business objectives, and not just
one which we restrict our attention to here. It should be noticed that when developing key indicators for a set of
business objectives, we need to take into account that key indicators (i.e., software or infrastructure) developed for
one business objective may affect the validity of key indicators developed for another.
In the following we offer additional explanations for each of the six main steps of the ValidKI method.
A. Establish target
The first main step of ValidKI is all about understanding the target, i.e., understanding exactly what the business
objective means and acquiring the necessary understanding of the relevant part of business for which the business
objective has been formulated. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the first sub-step we characterize the
business objective more precisely by formulating constraints that need to be fulfilled. In the second sub-step we
specify the relevant part of the business.
B. Identify risks to fulfillment of business objective
The second main step of ValidKI is concerned with conducting a risk analysis to identify risks to the fulfillment
of the business objective. We distinguish between three sub-steps. In the first sub-step the risk acceptance criteria are
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specified. The criteria classify a risk as either acceptable or unacceptable based on its likelihood and consequence. In
the second sub-step we identify how threats may initiate risks. We also identify vulnerabilities and threat scenarios
leading up to the risks, and we estimate likelihood and consequence. During the risk analysis we may identify
risks that pull in the same direction. Such risks should be combined into one risk. The individual risks may be
acceptable when considered in isolation, while the combined risk may be unacceptable. In the third sub-step we
evaluate the identified risks with respect to the specified risk acceptance criteria.
C. Identify key indicators to monitor risks
The third main step of ValidKI is concerned with identifying key indicators to monitor the unacceptable risks
identified in the previous step. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the first sub-step we specify how sensors
should be deployed in the relevant part of business. The key indicators that we identify are to be calculated based
on data gathered by the sensors. In the second sub-step we specify our requirements to the key indicators with
respect to the deployed sensors. The two sub-steps are typically conducted in parallel.
D. Evaluate internal validity
The fourth main step of ValidKI is concerned with evaluating whether the set of key indicators is internally valid
with respect to the business objective. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the first sub-step we reformulate
the precise business objective by expressing it in terms of the identified key indicators. This step serves as an
introductory step in the evaluation of internal validity. In the second sub-step we evaluate whether the set of key
indicators is internally valid by showing that the reformulated precise business objective from Step 4.1 correctly
measures the fulfillment of the precise business objective from Step 1.1.
Internal validity may be decomposed into a broad category of criteria [8]. In the following we list the criteria
that we take into consideration. For each criterion, we first provide the definition as given in [8], before we list the
papers on which the definition is based.
• Attribute validity: “A metric has attribute validity if the measurements correctly exhibit the attribute that
the metric is intending to measure” [9][10]. In our case, the key indicator needs to correctly exhibit the risk
attribute (likelihood or consequence) of the risk that it is measuring. In addition, the key indicator is of little
value if it can only produce values that always result in the risk being acceptable or unacceptable.
• Factor independence: “A metric has factor independence if the individual measurements used in the metric
formulation are independent of each other” [11]. This criterion applies especially to composite key indicators
that are composed of basic key indicators. A composite key indicator has factor independence if the basic key
indicators are independent of each other, i.e., if they do not rely on the same measurements.
• Internal consistency: “A metric has internal consistency if “all of the elementary measurements of a metric are
assessing the same construct and are inter-related”” [12]. This criterion also applies especially to composite
key indicators that are composed of basic key indicators. If the basic key indicators measure things that are
not conceptually related, then the composite key indicator will not have internal consistency. For instance,
let us say that we have a composite key indicator that is composed of two basic key indicators. The first
basic key indicator measures the code complexity of a software product, while the second measures the cost
of shipping the software product to the customers. In this case, the composite key indicator does not have
internal consistency, since the two basic key indicators are not conceptually related.
• Appropriate continuity: “A metric has appropriate continuity if the metric is defined (or undefined) for all
values according to the attribute being measured” [10]. An example of a discontinuity is fraction calculations
when the denominator is zero. To avoid discontinuity, the key indicator should be defined for that case.
• Dimensional consistency: “A metric has dimensional consistency if the formulation of multiple metrics into
a composite metric is performed by a scientifically well-understood mathematical function” [10][13]. Under
dimensional consistency, no information should be lost during the construction of composite key indicators.
Loss of information may be experienced if different scales are used for the basic and composite key indicators.
• Unit validity: “A metric has unit validity if the units used are an appropriate means of measuring the attribute”
[10][14]. For instance, the unit fault rate may be used to measure the attribute program correctness [10].
If the set is not internally valid, then we iterate by re-doing Step 3.
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E. Specify key indicator designs
In the fifth main step of ValidKI we specify the designs of the identified key indicators. Each design specifies
how the key indicator should be calculated. The design also shows how sensors, actors, and different components
interact.
F. Evaluate construct validity
In the sixth main step of ValidKI we evaluate whether the set of key indicators has construct validity with respect
to the business objective. As with internal validity, construct validity may be decomposed into a broad category of
criteria [8]. In the following we list the criteria that we take into consideration. For each criterion, we first provide
the definition as given in [8], before we list the papers on which the definition is based.
• Stability: “A metric has stability if it produces the same values “on repeated collections of data under similar
circumstances”” [12][15][16]. A key indicator whose calculation involves decisions made by humans, may
for example result in different values and thus lack of stability.
• Instrument validity: “A metric has instrument validity if the underlying measurement instrument is valid and
properly calibrated” [10]. In our case, this criterion concerns the sensors that perform the measurements that
the key indicator calculations rely on.
• Definition validity: “A metric has definition validity if the metric definition is clear and unambiguous such
that its collection can be implemented in a unique, deterministic way” [11][15][16][17][18]. This criterion
concerns the implementation of the key indicators. To implement a key indicator correctly, the key indicator’s
design specification needs to be clear and unambiguous.
To evaluate the different criteria, we re-do the risk analysis from Step 2.2 with the precise business objective
replaced by the reformulated precise business objective, which is the precise business objective expressed in terms
of key indicators. For each key indicator we identify risks towards the correctness of the reformulated precise
business objective that are the result of threats to criteria for construct validity that the key indicator needs to fulfill.
If the risk analysis does not result in any new unacceptable risks, then we have established construct validity for
each key indicator. If the set does not have construct validity, then we iterate. We will most likely be re-doing Step
5, but it may also be the case that we need to come up with new key indicators and new sensors. In that case,
we re-do Step 3. If the set of key indicators is both internally valid and has construct validity with respect to the
business objective, then we have established that the set is valid.
IV. ESTABLISH TARGET
In the following we assume that we have been hired to help the public hospital Client H design key indicators
to monitor their compliance with Article 8 in the European Convention on Human Rights [19]. The article states
the following:
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Client H needs to comply with Article 8 since it is a public authority. The consequence for Client H of not
complying with Article 8 may be economic loss and damaged reputation. One example [20] of violation of Article
8 is from Finland. A Finnish woman was first treated for HIV at a hospital, before she later started working there
as a nurse. While working there she suspected that her co-workers had unlawfully gained access to her medical
data. She brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg which unanimously held that
the district health authority responsible for the hospital had violated Article 8 by not protecting the medical data
of the woman properly. The district health authority was held liable to pay damages to the woman. Client H has
therefore established the following business objective:
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Business objective BO-A8: Client H complies with Article 8 in the European Convention on Human Rights.
Client H wants to make use of key indicators to monitor the degree of fulfillment of BO-A8, and now they have
hired us to use ValidKI to design them. In the rest of this section we conduct Step 1 of ValidKI on behalf of Client
H with respect to BO-A8.
A. Express business objectives more precisely (Step 1.1 of ValidKI)
Article 8 states under which circumstances a public authority can interfere with someone’s right to privacy. One
of these circumstances is “for the protection of health,” which is what Client H wants us to focus on. In the context
of Client H this means to provide medical assistance to patients. The ones who provide this assistance are the
health-care professionals of Client H.
The medical history of a patient is regarded as both sensitive and private. At Client H, the medical history of a
patient is stored in an electronic patient record (EPR). An EPR is “an electronically managed and stored collection
or collocation of recorded/registered information on a patient in connection with medical assistance” [21]. The
main purpose of an EPR is to communicate information between health-care professionals that provide medical
care to a patient. To protect the privacy of its patients, Client H restricts the use of EPRs. In order to comply with
Article 8, Client H allows a health-care professional to interfere with the privacy of a patient only when providing
medical assistance to this patient. Hence, the dealing with EPRs within the realms of Client H is essential.
For Client H it is important that every access to information in an EPR is in accordance with Article 8. A health-
care professional should only access a patient’s EPR if he/she provides medical assistance to that patient, and he/she
should only access information that is necessary for providing the medical assistance. The information accessed
can not be used for any other purpose than providing medical assistance to patients. Accesses to information in
EPRs not needed for providing medical assistance would not be in accordance with Article 8. Also, employees
that are not health-care professionals and work within the jurisdiction of Client H are not allowed to access EPRs.
Based on the constraints provided by Client H, we decide to express BO-A8 more precisely as follows:
Precise business objective PBO-A8: C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3
• Constraint C1: Health-care professionals acting on behalf of Client H access:
– a patient’s EPR only when providing medical assistance to that patient
– only the information in a patient’s EPR that is necessary for providing medical assistance to that patient
• Constraint C2: Health-care professionals acting on behalf of Client H do not use the information obtained
from a patient’s EPR for any other purpose than providing medical assistance to that patient.
• Constraint C3: Employees that are not health-care professionals and that work within the jurisdiction of Client
H do not access EPRs.
As indicated by PBO-A8’s definition, all three constraints must be fulfilled in order for PBO-A8 to be fulfilled.
B. Describe relevant part of business (Step 1.2 of ValidKI)
To design key indicators to monitor BO-A8 we need to understand the part of business that is to comply with
BO-A8 and therefore is to be monitored. “Public hospital Client H” has outsourced some of its medical services
to two private hospitals. These two are referred to as “Private hospital X-ray” and “Private hospital Blood test
analysis” in Fig. 4. The first hospital does all the X-ray work for Client H, while the second hospital does all
the blood test analyses. Client H is not only responsible for its own handling of EPRs, but also the outsourcing
partners’ handling of EPRs, when they act on behalf of Client H.
In Fig. 4, the rectangles inside and outside the gray containers represent systems/actors, while the arrows in
the figure represent the exchange of data between different systems/actors. In the figure, we only show some of
the rectangles and arrows that should be part of the gray containers of “Public hospital Client H” and “Private
hospital Blood test analysis.” All the rectangles and arrows with names in italic that are part of the gray container
of “Private hospital X-ray” should also be part of the gray containers of “Public hospital Client H” and “Private
hospital Blood test analysis.”
As can be seen in Fig. 4, Client H outsources medical tasks to the two private hospitals, and gets in return
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Fig. 4. Specification of relevant part of business
handling the EPRs. An EPR system is “an electronic system with the necessary functionality to record, retrieve,
present, communicate, edit, correct, and delete information in electronic patient records” [21]. These systems use
EPRs provided by different health-care institutions. As shown in Fig. 4, these systems are only of interest when
they handle EPRs where Client H is responsible for their handling.
At the three health-care institutions, most of the medical tasks that a health-care professional conducts during
a working day are known in advance. It is known which patients the professional will treat and what kind of
information the professional will need access to in order to treat the different patients. Client H and the two
outsourcing partners maintain for each health-care professional an authorization list documenting which patients
the professional is treating and what kind of information the professional needs for this purpose. These lists are
used by the EPR systems and they are updated on a daily basis by the medical task management systems. Many
of these updates are automatic. For instance, when Client H is assigned a new patient, then this patient is added to
the lists of the health-care professionals who will be treating this patient.
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Each EPR is owned by a patient, which is natural since the information stored in the EPR is about the patient in
question. As already mentioned, the content of a patient’s EPR is both considered sensitive and private. Moreover,
some of the EPRs may contain information that is considered highly sensitive and private. Such information may
for instance describe medical treatment received by a patient in relation to:
• the patient being the victim of a crime (e.g., rape, violence, etc.);
• sexual transferable diseases or abortion; and
• mortal or infectious mortal diseases.
Information classified as highly sensitive and private is handled with even more care than information that is just
classified as sensitive and private. To raise awareness of the criticality of such information and to enable monitoring
of its use, the EPR systems at the three health-care institutions tag highly sensitive and private information in EPRs
based on predefined rules.
Accesses to information in EPRs can be classified as authorized or unauthorized based on the authorization lists
of health-care professionals. An access is classified as authorized if the professional needs the information to do a
planned task. Otherwise, the access is classified as unauthorized. If an access is classified as unauthorized then it
is possible to check in retrospect whether the access was necessary. In an emergency situation, for instance when a
patient is having a heart attack, a health-care professional often needs access to information in an EPR that he/she
was not supposed to access. By checking in retrospect whether unauthorized accesses were necessary it is possible
to classify the unauthorized accesses into two groups; one for accesses that were necessary, and one for those that
were not. The first group is called approved unauthorized accesses, while the second group is called not approved
unauthorized accesses. All accesses that are classified as not approved unauthorized accesses are considered as
illegal accesses.
At Client H and the two outsourcing partners, health-care professionals use smart cards for accessing information
in EPRs. If a card is lost or stolen, the owner must report it as missing, since missing cards may be used by other
health-care professionals or others to access EPRs illegally. When the card has been registered as missing it can
no longer be used. When reporting it as missing, the last time the card owner used it before noticing that it was
missing is recorded. All accesses to EPRs that have occurred between this time and the time it was registered as
missing are considered as illegal accesses.
At the three hospitals, the doors into the different areas are fitted with smart card locks. In order to open a door,
an employee needs to insert his/hers smart card into the lock. A security system is used by each hospital to allow
or deny an employee access to a specific area based on the employee’s access credentials. Moreover, health-care
professionals often need to print information in EPRs. Each hospital relies on a printing system to achieve this.
This system issues the different print jobs to printers located in rooms with doors fitted with smart card locks.
Since each printer is used by a number of employees, the three hospitals run the risk of printed information being
disclosed to other employees if the employee responsible for the print job forgets to collect his/hers printout. To
minimize this risk, each hospital has security employees that collect uncollected printouts of information from EPRs
at the different printers on a regular basis. Each printer at the three hospitals annotates each printout with the date
and time it was printed, as well as an ID for the employee that issued the print job. A security employee removes
a printout of sensitive and private information from an EPR if it has been laying on the printer for 30 minutes
or more, while he/she removes a printout of highly sensitive and private information if it has been laying on the
printer for 15 minutes or more. For each removed printout, the health-care professional that issued the print job is
notified about the removal and asked to collect the printout at the security office at the hospital in question.
A health-care professional relies from time to time on information obtained from patients’ EPRs for other purposes
than providing medical assistance to the patients in question. The information may be needed for the purpose of
providing medical assistance to another patient, or it may be needed in research projects. To support these tasks, the
three hospitals have made it possible for health-care professionals to obtain anonymized information from EPRs,
i.e., information that cannot be linked to specific patients. It should be noticed that health-care professionals need
to obtain specific permissions to obtain and use anonymized information from EPRs.
At each of the three hospitals, a media retriever service is used to collect relevant information from the traditional
media (newspapers, TV, radio, etc.) and the Internet media (Internet newspapers, etc.). The three hospitals also
encourage the general public to provide feedback on how satisfied they are with the hospitals’ services. The general
public also serves another purpose for the three hospitals. The media retriever services can only to a limited extent
retrieve information from social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and Internet forums. The three hospitals therefore
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TABLE I
CONSEQUENCE SCALE FOR THE ASSET “FULFILLMENT OF PBO-A8” (TOP) AND LIKELIHOOD SCALE (BOTTOM)
Consequence Description
Catastrophic Law enforcement agencies penalize Client H after having been notified about the incident
Major Health authorities penalize Client H after having been notified about the incident
Moderate Health authorities are notified about the incident
Minor Head of hospital is notified about the incident
Insignificant Head of department is notified about the incident
Likelihood Description
Certain Five times or more per year [50,∞〉 : 10 years
Likely Two to five times per year [20, 49] : 10 years
Possible Once a year [6, 19] : 10 years
Unlikely Less than once per year [2, 5] : 10 years
Rare Less than once per ten years [0, 1] : 10 years
TABLE II
RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FOR THE ASSET “FULFILLMENT OF PBO-A8”
Likelihood






encourage the general public to notify them about information found in social media or on Internet forums that
may be of relevance. A person of the general public is awarded if the information is very relevant. The information
provided by the media retriever services and the general public is first and foremost used by the hospitals to assess
how they are perceived by the public. Sometimes, however, the collected information may indicate or reveal that
information from EPRs have been leaked to the public.
V. IDENTIFY RISKS TO FULFILLMENT OF BUSINESS OBJECTIVE
A. Specify risk acceptance criteria (Step 2.1 of ValidKI)
Before we specify the risk acceptance criteria, we need to establish scales for measuring likelihood and conse-
quence. Table I presents these scales. We view “Fulfillment of PBO-A8” as the asset to be protected. In Table II the
risk acceptance criteria for the asset “Fulfillment of PBO-A8” are expressed in terms of a risk evaluation matrix.
Risks whose values belong to the white area of the matrix are acceptable, while risks whose values belong to the
gray area are unacceptable.
B. Risk identification and estimation (Step 2.2 of ValidKI)
Based on the information provided by the representatives of Client H, we identify and estimate risk. For this
purpose we use the CORAS methodology [22]. However, other approaches to risk analysis may be used instead.
Using CORAS we identify how threats may initiate risks that harm the asset “Fulfillment of PBO-A8” if they occur.
The CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 5 provides a high-level overview of how the fulfillment of the precise
business objective PBO-A8 may be harmed. The threat diagram contains four referring threat scenarios that refer to
the referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 6 – 9. We refer to ix and oy of the referring threat scenarios as in-gate and
out-gate, respectively. Relations to an element inside a referenced threat scenario must go through an in-gate, while
relations to an element outside the referenced threat scenario must go through an out-gate. The likelihood value
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Fig. 5. CORAS threat diagram providing a high-level overview of the results from the risk identification and estimation
likelihood of an element inside the referenced threat scenario, while the likelihood of the out-gate oy documents
the contribution of the likelihood of an element inside the referenced threat scenario via gate oy to the likelihood
of an element outside the referenced threat scenario.
The CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 5 contains three human threats; one accidental (the white one) and two
deliberate (the black ones). The accidental human threat “Health-care professional” may initiate the threat scenario
“Unauthorized access to information in a patient’s EPR” in the referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional
performs a not approved unauthorized access to information in an EPR” in Fig. 7 via the in-gate i3 with likelihood
“Likely” by exploiting the vulnerability “No restrictions on what EPRs a health-care professional can access.” We
can also see that the deliberate human threat “Health-care professional” may initiate this threat scenario via the
in-gate i4 with likelihood “Possible” by exploiting the same vulnerability, and that the threat scenario occurs with
likelihood “Certain.” If the threat scenario in Fig. 7 occurs then it leads to the threat scenario “Unauthorized access
to sensitive and private information” in the same figure with conditional likelihood “0.7.” This threat scenario leads
to the risk “R5: Not approved unauthorized access to sensitive and private information in an EPR, where the owner
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Fig. 6. The referenced threat scenario “EPR information printed by a health-care professional is found by another health-care professional
or an employee that is not a health-care professional on the printer,” referred to in Fig. 5
of the EPR is a patient of the accessor” with conditional likelihood “0.6” if it occurs. The risk occurs with likelihood
“Likely.” As can be seen in Figs. 5 and 7, the risk impacts the asset “Fulfillment of PBO-A8” via the out-gate o7
with consequence “Insignificant” if it occurs.
The referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 6 – 9 document risks that affect the fulfillment of the constraints referred
to in the precise business objective PBO-A8. The risks R2, R4, R5 – R8, R15, and R16 affect the fulfillment
of constraint C1, while the risks R9 – R14 affect the fulfillment of constraint C2. Moreover, the risks R1, R3,
R17, and R18 affect the fulfillment of constraint C3. Notice that in the referenced threat scenario in Fig. 7, we
distinguish between not approved unauthorized accesses to information in EPRs where the owner of the EPR is a
patient and not a patient of the accessor. Client H finds it most serious if the owner of the EPR is not a patient of
the accessor. We also distinguish between not approved unauthorized accesses to sensitive and private information
and not approved unauthorized accesses to highly sensitive and private information. Naturally, Client H finds not
approved unauthorized accesses to the latter type of information the most serious.
16












access to highly 












R5: Not approved 
unauthorized access to 
sensitive and private 
information in an EPR, where 
the owner of the EPR is a 
patient of the accessor
[Likely]
R6: Not approved unauthorized access to sensitive 
and private information in an EPR, where the owner of 
the EPR is not a patient of the accessor
[Possible]
R7: Not approved unauthorized access to highly 
sensitive and private information in an EPR, where the 
owner of the EPR is a patient of the accessor
[Possible]
R8: Not approved 
unauthorized access to highly 
sensitive and private 
information in an EPR, where 
the owner of the EPR is not a 








Fig. 7. The referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional performs a not approved unauthorized access to information in an EPR,”
referred to in Fig. 5
TABLE III
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE II WITH THE ACCEPTABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE RISKS INSERTED
Likelihood
Consequence Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Rare R15, R17 R18
Unlikely R3 R12, R16
Possible R6, R7 R1, R4, R9,
R11
R8, R10
Likely R5, R13 R2, R14
Certain
C. Risk evaluation (Step 2.3 of ValidKI)
The risk evaluation consists in plotting the risks into the risk evaluation matrix according to their likelihoods and
consequences. As indicated in Table III, four out of the 18 risks namely R8, R10, R12, and R16 are unacceptable
with respect to the fulfillment of the precise business objective PBO-A8.
During the risk evaluation, we also decide that some of the risks need to be accumulated since they pull in the
same direction. We decide to accumulate the following risks: R1 and R2; R3 and R4; R15 and R17; and R16
and R18. All of these risks, with the exception of R18, are acceptable when considered in isolation. Risks are
accumulated by accumulating their likelihood and consequence values. We accumulate the risks as follows:
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Fig. 8. The referenced threat scenario “Information obtained from a patient’s EPR is used for other purposes than providing medical
assistance to the patient in question,” referred to in Fig. 5
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Fig. 9. The referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-care professional uses a lost/stolen
smart card to access information in an EPR,” referred to in Fig. 5
• The accumulated risk “R1&R2: Another health-care professional or employee that is not a health-care profes-
sional finds a printout of sensitive and private information on the printer.” It occurs with likelihood “Likely”
and it impacts the asset with consequence “Moderate.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R1 which occurs with likelihood “Possible,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Moderate.”
– The risk R2 which occurs with likelihood “Likely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Minor.”
• The accumulated risk “R3&R4: Another health-care professional or employee that is not a health-care pro-
fessional finds a printout of highly sensitive and private information on the printer.” It occurs with likelihood
“Possible” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R3 which occurs with likelihood “Unlikely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
– The risk R4 which occurs with likelihood “Possible,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Moderate.”
• The accumulated risk “R15&R17: Access by a health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-
care professional to sensitive and private information in an EPR from a lost/stolen smart card.” It occurs with
likelihood “Rare” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R15 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
– The risk R17 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
• The accumulated risk “R16&R18: Access by a health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-care
professional to highly sensitive and private information in an EPR from a lost/stolen smart card.” It occurs
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TABLE IV
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE III AFTER RISKS HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED
Likelihood




Possible R6, R7 R9, R11 R3&R4, R8,
R10
Likely R13 R5, R14 R1&R2
Certain
with likelihood “Unlikely” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Catastrophic.” The accumulated risk is
based on:
– The risk R16 which occurs with likelihood “Unlikely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Catastrophic.”
– The risk R18 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Catas-
trophic.”
Since we are operating with a coarse-grained likelihood scale with intervals, we find it sufficient to do a rough
aggregation of the likelihoods in order to determine to which likelihood interval the different accumulated risks
belong. For the accumulated risk R15&R17 we end up with the likelihood “Rare,” while for each of the other
accumulated risks, we end up with an aggregated likelihood that gravitates towards the highest of the two likelihoods.
We therefore decide to use the highest likelihood to represent the accumulated likelihood in each of these cases.
Moreover, we accumulate consequences by taking the average. In all of the cases where the two consequence
values differ, we end up with an average that gravitates towards the highest consequence value. We therefore find
it suitable to use the highest consequence value to represent the accumulated consequence in each of these cases.
In Table IV we have plotted the accumulated risks according to their likelihoods and consequences. As we can
see from the table, all the accumulated risks with the exception of R15&R17 are unacceptable. Table IV shows
that the risks R1&R2, R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 are unacceptable with respect to the fulfillment of
the precise business objective PBO-A8.
VI. IDENTIFY KEY INDICATORS TO MONITOR RISKS
A. Deploy sensors to monitor risks (Step 3.1 of ValidKI)
Fig. 10, which is a detailing of the target description in Fig. 4, specifies the deployment of sensors in the
relevant part of business. This specification corresponds to the sensor deployment specification referred to in Fig. 2.
An antenna-like symbol is used to represent each sensor in Fig. 10. The different sensors monitor data messages
exchanged within the relevant part of business. The results from the monitoring are to be used in the calculation
of key indicators.
In Fig. 10, sensor deployments are only shown for “Private hospital X-ray.” It should be noticed that “Public
hospital Client H” and “Private hospital Blood test analysis” will have the same sensors as “Private hospital X-ray.”
The following sensors are deployed in the relevant part of business:
• SCH-REG-MIS-SC, SBTA-REG-MIS-SC, and SXR-REG-MIS-SC monitor data messages related to the registration of missing
smart cards at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-AUTH-LIST, SBTA-AUTH-LIST, and SXR-AUTH-LIST monitor data messages related to the authorization lists em-
ployed by the EPR systems at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, and SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR monitor data messages where each message is a
request issued by health-care professional to access information in an EPR at Client H, Blood test analysis, and
X-ray, respectively. It is not necessary to monitor the actual information received, since health-care professionals
will always get the information they request.
• SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, and SXR-INFO-GP monitor data messages where each message contains info/feedback
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Fig. 10. Deployment of sensors in the relevant part of business
• SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, and SXR-INFO-MRS monitor data messages where each message contains relevant
information collected by media retriever services from the traditional media or the Internet for Client H, Blood
test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, and SXR-PR-REQS monitor data messages related to printing of information in EPRs
by health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, and SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP monitor data messages related to area access re-
quests issued by health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, and SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP monitor data messages related to area access
requests issued by employees that are not health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray,
respectively.
• SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, and SXR-INFO-UNC-PO monitor data messages related to registrations of uncol-
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TABLE V
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KPR-SP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO , KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO , AND KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SX-ACC-REQS-HCP, SX-PR-REQS, SX-INFO-UNC-PO : M∗
Out: KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that health-care professionals or employees
that are not health-care professionals have found printouts of sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers
at X”
Requirements for KPR-SP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP : M∗
SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP : M
∗
SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, SXR-PR-REQS : M
∗
SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, SXR-INFO-UNC-PO : M
∗
Out: KPR-SP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KPR-SP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE VI
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO , KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO , AND KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SX-ACC-REQS-HCP, SX-PR-REQS, SX-INFO-UNC-PO : M∗
Out: KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that health-care professionals or employees
that are not health-care professionals have found printouts of highly sensitive and private information from EPRs on
printers at X”
Requirements for KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP : M∗
SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP : M
∗
SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, SXR-PR-REQS : M
∗
SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, SXR-INFO-UNC-PO : M
∗
Out: KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
lected printouts of information from EPRs by security employees at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray,
respectively.
B. Specify requirements to key indicators wrt deployed sensors (Step 3.2 of ValidKI)
Two key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are identified to monitor the likelihood values of the two
unacceptable risks R1&R2 and R3&R4, respectively. In Tables V and VI their requirements are given. The two
key indicators calculate likelihoods with respect to a ten year period, because the likelihoods in the likelihood scale
in Table I are defined with respect to a ten year period. Both key indicators are composed of basic key indicators.
Table V presents the requirements to the basic key indicators that KPR-SP-EPR-INFO is composed of, while Table VI
presents the requirements to the basic key indicators that KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO is composed of.
For each key indicator we specify required sensor data. All of the key indicators rely on sequences of data
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TABLE VII
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC , KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC , AND KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Requirements for KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-AUTH-LIST, SX-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
Out: KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC : N
Description: KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = “The number of not approved unauthorized accesses at X since the monitoring started to
highly sensitive and private information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors”
Requirements for KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
In: SCH-AUTH-LIST, SBTA-AUTH-LIST, SXR-AUTH-LIST : M∗
SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M
∗
Out: KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC : R
Description: KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC =
10 · (KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE VIII
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY INDICATORS
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO , KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO , AND KXR-SP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-SP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-INFO-EPR, SX-INFO-GP, SX-INFO-MRS : M∗
Out: KX-SP-EPR-INFO : N
Description: KX-SP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that sensitive and private information from
patients’ EPRs have been shared by health-care professionals with others and where this information have ended up
in the traditional media or on the Internet”
Requirements for KSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, SXR-INFO-GP : M
∗
SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, SXR-INFO-MRS : M
∗
Out: KSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-SP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
messages (M∗) gathered by the different sensors. We also specify the output type and requirements to output. For
a key indicator K we refer to its requirement description as Req(K).
Key indicators have also been identified for monitoring the unacceptable risks R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18.
Tables VII, VIII, IX, and X specify requirements to key indicators for monitoring the likelihood values of the risks
R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18, respectively.
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TABLE IX
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KHSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO , KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO , AND KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-HSP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-INFO-EPR, SX-INFO-GP, SX-INFO-MRS : M∗
Out: KX-HSP-EPR-INFO : N
Description: KX-HSP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that highly sensitive and private information
from patients’ EPRs have been shared by health-care professionals with others and where this information have
ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
Requirements for KHSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, SXR-INFO-GP : M
∗
SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, SXR-INFO-MRS : M
∗
Out: KHSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KHSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE X
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KILL-ACC-SC AND THE BASIC KEY INDICATORS
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC , KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC , AND KXR-ILL-ACC-SC
Requirements for KX-ILL-ACC-SC, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-REG-MIS-SC, SX-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
Out: KX-ILL-ACC-SC : N
Description: KX-ILL-ACC-SC = “The number of illegal accesses at X since the monitoring started to highly sensitive and private
information in EPRs from lost/stolen smart cards”
Requirements for KILL-ACC-SC
In: SCH-REG-MIS-SC, SBTA-REG-MIS-SC, SXR-REG-MIS-SC : M∗
SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M
∗
Out: KILL-ACC-SC : R
Description: KILL-ACC-SC =
10 · (KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC + KXR-ILL-ACC-SC)
Number of years since the monitoring started
VII. EVALUATE INTERNAL VALIDITY
A. Express business objective in terms of key indicators (Step 4.1 of ValidKI)
The precise business objective PBO-A8’ is a reformulation of the precise business objective PBO-A8 expressed
in terms of key indicators.
PBO-A8’ = KPR-SP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 19] ∧ Req(KSP-PR-EPR-INFO) ∧
KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KHSP-PR-EPR-INFO) ∧
KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC) ∧
KSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KSP-EPR-INFO) ∧
KHSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 1] ∧ Req(KHSP-EPR-INFO) ∧
KILL-ACC-SC ∈ [0, 1] ∧ Req(KILL-ACC-SC)
The precise business objective PBO-A8 is fulfilled if the likelihood values of the six unacceptable risks R1&R2,
R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 change in such a way that the six risks become acceptable. The risks
become acceptable if their likelihood values change in the following way:
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TABLE XI
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX WHEN THE PRECISE BUSINESS OBJECTIVE PBO-A8 IS FULFILLED
Likelihood








Possible R6, R7 R1&R2′′′,
R9, R11
Likely R13 R5, R14
Certain
• The risk R1&R2 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Likely” to “Possible,” “Unlikely,” or
“Rare.” The likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KPR-SP-EPR-INFO, monitoring
the likelihood, is contained in the interval [0, 19] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years,” “Unlikely:
[2, 5] : 10 years,” and “Possible: [6, 19] : 10 years”).
• The risk R3&R4 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood,
is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely: [2, 5] : 10
years”).
• The risk R8 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, monitoring the
likelihood, is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely:
[2, 5] : 10 years”).
• The risk R10 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood,
is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely: [2, 5] : 10
years”).
• The risk R12 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Unlikely” to “Rare.” The likelihood will
change in such a way if the composite key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood, is contained in
the interval [0, 1] (interval capturing “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years”).
• The risk R16&R18 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Unlikely” to “Rare.” The likelihood
will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KILL-ACC-SC, monitoring the likelihood, is contained
in the interval [0, 1] (interval capturing “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years”).
Moreover, the different composite key indicators need to measure the likelihoods correctly in order to measure the
fulfillment of PBO-A8. This can be determined based on the requirements to the different composite key indicators.
These requirements are captured by Req(KPR-SP-EPR-INFO), Req(KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO), etc.
The reformulated precise business objective can also be used to determine to what degree the precise business
objective is fulfilled. For instance, if KPR-SP-EPR-INFO equals 20 while the other composite key indicators equal 0,
then PBO-A8 is close to being fulfilled. On the other hand, if KPR-SP-EPR-INFO equals 25 instead, then PBO-A8 is
far from being fulfilled.
B. Evaluate criteria for internal validity (Step 4.2 of ValidKI)
To evaluate the internal validity of the set of key indicators, we need to show that the reformulated precise
business objective PBO-A8’ measures the fulfillment of the precise business objective PBO-A8. We evaluate the
internal validity of each composite key indicator based on the criteria given in Section III-D.
To evaluate attribute validity we need to compare the definitions of the six risks with the requirements to the
composite key indicators. The definitions of the risks R8, R10, and R12 are given in Figs. 7 and 8, while the
definitions of the accumulated risks R1&R2, R3&R4, and R16&R18 are given in Section V-C. Moreover, the
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requirements to the composite key indicators are given by Req(KPR-SP-EPR-INFO), Req(KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO), etc. In all
six cases there is a match between the definition of the risk and the requirements to the composite key indicator.
We therefore conclude that the composite key indicators correctly exhibit the likelihood attributes of the six risks
that the composite key indicators intend to measure. In addition, based on the requirements specified for the six
composite key indicators it is clear that the six composite key indicators are not restricted to only producing values
that are always contained or not contained in the intervals mentioned above. Thus, both acceptable and unacceptable
risks can be detected.
Moreover, all the composite key indicators have factor independence. Each composite key indicator is calculated
based on three basic key indicators. These are independent of each other, since they are computed by three different
health-care institutions. The six composite key indicators do also have internal consistency, since the three basic
key indicators employed by each composite key indicator measure the same thing, but at different health-care
institutions. The three basic key indicators are therefore conceptually related.
We continue the evaluation of internal validity by evaluating whether the composite key indicators have appropriate
continuity. All are discontinuous if “Number of years since the monitoring started” equals zero. Client H does
not consider this to be a problem, since the denominator will in all six cases be a real number that is never zero.
We also show that the six composite key indicators have dimensional consistency. Each composite key indicator
adds three likelihoods, where each is for the period of “Number of years since the monitoring started” years, and
transforms the resulting likelihood into a likelihood which is for a period of ten years. Thus, no information is
lost when constructing the composite key indicators from their respective basic key indicators. The six composite
key indicators do also have unit validity. All six use the unit “likelihood per ten years,” which is appropriate for
measuring the six likelihood attributes of the risks.
Based on the evaluation of the different internal validity types of criteria above, we conclude that the set of key
indicators is internally valid. When the precise business objective PBO-A8 is fulfilled, we get the risk evaluation
matrix in Table XI. In this situation, all of the risks R1&R2, R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 are acceptable.
Moreover, the risks will have the following likelihood values when acceptable:
• The risk R1&R2 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R1&R2′), “Unlikely” (R1&R2′′), or “Possible”
(R1&R2′′′).
• The risk R3&R4 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R3&R4′) or “Unlikely” (R3&R4′′).
• The risk R8 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R8′) or “Unlikely” (R8′′).
• The risk R10 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R10′) or “Unlikely” (R10′′).
• The risk R12 will have the likelihood “Rare”.
• The risk R16&R18 will have the likelihood “Rare”.
VIII. SPECIFY KEY INDICATOR DESIGNS
We use the UML [6] sequence diagram notation for the key indicator design specifications, but one may of
course also use other languages depending on the problem in question. In the following sub-sections, we specify
the designs of the six composite key indicators and their respective basic key indicators.
A. Key indicator designs for KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 11 specifies how the key indicator KPR-SP-EPR-INFO is calculated. Each entity in the
sequence diagram is either a component, a sensor, or an employee at Client H, and it is represented by a dashed,
vertical line called a lifeline, where the box at its top specifies which entity the lifeline represents. The entities
interact with each other through the transmission and reception of messages, which are shown as horizontal arrows
from the transmitting lifeline to the receiving lifeline. We can also see that a lifeline can be both the sender and
receiver of a message.
The sequence diagram contains one reference (ref) to another sequence diagram. This reference can be replaced
by the content of the sequence diagram that it refers to. The reference refers to the sequence diagram given in Fig.
12, which describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We do not present
sequence diagrams describing the calculations of the two other basic key indicators, since these calculations are
performed in the same way as the calculation of KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, and since these calculations involve the same
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KPR-SP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO))  ⁄  













Fig. 11. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KPR-SP-EPR-INFO”
types of lifelines as the ones described in Fig. 12. For the two other basic key indicators we only show that they are
sent to “Component for calculating KPR-SP-EPR-INFO,” and that they are used in the calculation of KPR-SP-EPR-INFO.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 12 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. The
first thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO” retrieves the value that was computed
for the basic key indicator in the previous week. Afterwards, the component counts for each printout the number
of health-care professionals and employees that are not health-care professionals that accessed the printer room
between TIME 1 (the time the print job was completed) and TIME 2 (the time when the health-care professional
collected his/hers printout or the time when the printout was collected by a security employee). The number NUM
is the number of other health-care professionals and employees that are not health-care professionals that may have
seen the printout of sensitive and private information.
Client H is of the opinion that between 10% and 30% of the other health-care professionals and employees
that are not health-care professionals that accessed the printer rooms between TIME 1 and TIME 2 have seen the
printouts of sensitive and private information from patients’ EPRs. Thus, the number TOTAL NUM is multiplied by
[0.1, 0.3]. In the end, the component stores the basic key indicator before sending it to “Component for calculating
KPR-SP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 11.
B. Key indicator designs for KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 13 specifies how the key indicator KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 14 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 14 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO is updated each week.
This sequence diagram is almost identical to the one in Fig. 12. Thus, we do not give any further explanations for
the sequence diagram.
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ACC_PRINT_AREAS_NHCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by employees that are 
not health-care professionals in the period of one week 
backwards
SP_PRINT_LIST: All requests to print 
sensitive and private info in EPRs 
issued by health-care professionals at 
Client H in the period of one week 
backwards
TOTAL_NUM = 0
KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the monitoring up to the end of the 
previous week that health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
have found printouts of sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers at Client H”
loop ( PRINT_REQ = 0, number of elements in SP_PRINT_LIST )
Store KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO
Get the room number ROOM_NO for where the printer handling PRINT_REQ is located
Get the number of health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
NUM that accessed ROOM_NO between TIME_1 and TIME_2
Get the time TIME_1 for when PRINT_REQ was printed and get the time TIME_2 for when 
the health-care professional accessed ROOM_NO to collect PRINT_REQ
opt [TIME_2 is undefined]
TIME_2 = TIME_REM
TOTAL_NUM = TOTAL_NUM + NUM 
ACC_PRINT_AREAS_HCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by health-care 
professionals in the period of one week backwards




REG_UNC_PO: All registrations of uncollected printouts of 
sensitive and private information that have been removed by 
security employees at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Get the time TIME_REM from REG_UNC_PO for when the uncollected printout 
resulting from PRINT_REQ was removed by a security employee
Fig. 12. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO”
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KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO))  ⁄  













Fig. 13. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO”
C. Key indicator designs for KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 15 specifies how the key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is calculated, while the
sequence diagram in Fig. 16 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC at Client
H. We use the same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two
other basic key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 16 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is updated each
week. The first thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC” sends the value
that was computed for the basic key indicator in the previous week to “Employee at Client H.” Afterwards, the
component identifies “All unauthorized accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to highly sensitive
and private information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors” based on input
from the entities representing the sensors. The “Employee at Client H” performs a manual inspection of each of
these unauthorized accesses, and classifies each as approved or not approved. If the unauthorized access is classified
as not approved, then the basic key indicator is incremented by one. After all the unauthorized accesses have been
inspected and classified, “Employee at Client H” sends the basic key indicator to the component which stores it.
Afterwards, the component sends the basic key indicator to “Component for calculating KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC,” as
illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 15.
D. Key indicator designs for KSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 17 specifies how the key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 18 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 18 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. The
first thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO” sends the value that was computed
for the basic key indicator in the previous week to “Employee at Client H”. Afterwards, the component receives
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ACC_PRINT_AREAS_NHCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by employees that are 
not health-care professionals in the period of one week 
backwards
HSP_PRINT_LIST: All requests to print 
highly sensitive and private info in EPRs 
issued by health-care professionals at 
Client H in the period of one week 
backwards
TOTAL_NUM = 0
KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the monitoring up to the end of the 
previous week that health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
have found printouts of highly sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers at Client H”
loop ( PRINT_REQ = 0, number of elements in HSP_PRINT_LIST )
Store KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Get the room number ROOM_NO for where the printer handling PRINT_REQ is located
Get the number of health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
NUM that accessed ROOM_NO between TIME_1 and TIME_2
Get the time TIME_1 for when PRINT_REQ was printed and get the time TIME_2 for when 
the health-care professional accessed ROOM_NO to collect PRINT_REQ
opt [TIME_2 is undefined]
TIME_2 = TIME_REM
TOTAL_NUM = TOTAL_NUM + NUM 
ACC_PRINT_AREAS_HCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by health-care 
professionals in the period of one week backwards




REG_UNC_PO: All registrations of uncollected printouts of 
highly sensitive and private information that have been removed by 
security employees at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Get the time TIME_REM from REG_UNC_PO for when the uncollected printout 
resulting from PRINT_REQ was removed by a security employee
Fig. 14. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO”
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(10 · (KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 
KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 
KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC))  ⁄  
Number of years since the monitoring started
Fig. 15. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC”
different kinds of data from the three sensors, where this data is used in the sequence diagram “Comparison of
data” in Fig. 19 for updating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO.
In the sequence diagram in Fig. 19, “Component for calculating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO” extracts all accesses to sensitive
and private information in EPRs that have occurred in the period of one week backwards. The component also
extracts all information items from INFO LIST 1 and INFO LIST 2 that both refer to Client H and the medical
history of a person. Since information retrieved from the traditional media or the Internet will refer to patients by
name, the different accesses are grouped with respect to patient names. In addition, duplicate accesses are removed,
since we are not interested in how many times some information has been accessed, but rather whether it has been
accessed or not. As can be seen in the sequence diagram, the different items of information retrieved from the
traditional media or the Internet are grouped in the same way as for accesses to information in EPRs.
After having grouped the different data, we check for the different information items whether they match
information that is retrieved when performing different accesses to information in EPRs. We use software to
identify potential matches, while an employee at Client H performs a manual check of the potential matches to
determine whether the sensitive and private information obtained from performing an access to information in an
EPR is really the source of the information that has been retrieved from the traditional media or the Internet.
When evaluating the potential matches, the employee needs to consider other potential sources for the information
leakage, such as the patient itself. The employee also needs to consider whether the information retrieved from the
traditional media or the Internet really refers to the same patient as the information obtained from an EPR does. If the
employee is confident that the information from the EPR is the source, then the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO
is incremented by one. In the end, the employee sends the updated basic key indicator to “Component for calculating
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in Fig. 18. The component stores the updated basic key indicator before sending it
to “Component for calculating KSP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 17.
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ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
AUTH_LISTS: All authorization lists used at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Perform manual inspection of 
UNAUTH_ACC and classify 
it as approved or not approved 
UNAUTH_ACC_LIST: All unauthorized accesses at Client H in 
the period of one week backwards to highly sensitive and private 
information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not 
patients of the accessors
loop ( UNAUTH_ACC = 0, number of items in UNAUTH_ACC_LIST )
opt
[UNAUTH_ACC is classifed as not approved]
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = 
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 1
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = ”The number of not approved 
unauthorized accesses at Client H since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week to highly 
sensitive and private information in EPRs, where the 
owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors”
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Store KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Fig. 16. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC”
E. Key indicator designs for KHSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 20 specifies how the key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 21 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 21 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. This
sequence diagram is almost identical to the one in Fig. 18, while the sequence diagram “Comparison of data” in
Fig. 22, which is referred to in Fig. 21, is almost identical to the one in Fig. 19. Thus, we do not give any further
explanations for the two sequence diagrams.
F. Key indicator designs for KILL-ACC-SC and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 23 specifies how the key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 24 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC at Client H. We use the same
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KSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-SP-EPR-INFO))  ⁄  






Fig. 17. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KSP-EPR-INFO”













KCH-SP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week that sensitive 
and private information about patients have been shared by 
health-care professionals with others and where this information 
have ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
INFO_LIST_1: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where each item has 











INFO_LIST_2: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where 
each item is feedback from someone in the general public or information that he/she has 
collected from the Internet in the period of one week backwards
Fig. 18. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-SP-EPR-INFO”
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SP_ACC_LIST: Extract all accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards 
to sensitive and private information in EPRs based on ACC_LIST
SP_ACC_GROUPS: Remove duplicate accesses in SP_ACC_LIST (accesses to the same information) 
and group accesses wrt patient names (all patients with the same name is put in the same group)
INFO_GROUPS: Extract all information items from INFO_LIST_1 and INFO_LIST_2 that both refers to Client H 
and the medical history of people, and remove duplicate items before grouping information items wrt the names 
of the people (all people with the same name is put in the same group)
EPR 
system
loop ( INFO_GROUP = 0, number of elements in INFO_GROUPS )
opt
[Name of INFO_GROUP == Name of SP_ACC_GROUP]
loop ( SP_ACC_GROUP = 0, number of elements in SP_ACC_GROUPS )
loop ( X = 0, number of items in INFO_GROUP )
Perform access Y
Info from EPR for access Y
opt
[Match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X]
loop ( Y = 0, number of items in SP_ACC_GROUP )
Info item X and info from EPR for 
access Y
Perform manual check to decide whether info from EPR for access Y is the source of info item X. 
Other possible sources are also considered during the check
opt [Info from EPR for access Y 
is the source of info item X]
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO = KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + 1
Check whether there is a match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X
Fig. 19. The sequence diagram “Comparison of data”
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KHSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO))  ⁄  






Fig. 20. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KHSP-EPR-INFO”













KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week that highly sensitive 
and private information about patients have been shared by 
health-care professionals with others and where this information 
have ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
INFO_LIST_1: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where each item has 











INFO_LIST_2: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where 
each item is feedback from someone in the general public or information that he/she has 
collected from the Internet in the period of one week backwards
Fig. 21. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO”
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HSP_ACC_LIST: Extract all accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards 
to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs based on ACC_LIST
HSP_ACC_GROUPS: Remove duplicate accesses in HSP_ACC_LIST (accesses to the same information) 
and group accesses wrt patient names (all patients with the same name is put in the same group)
INFO_GROUPS: Extract all information items from INFO_LIST_1 and INFO_LIST_2 that both refers to Client H 
and the medical history of people, and remove duplicate items before grouping information items wrt the names 
of the people (all people with the same name is put in the same group)
EPR 
system
loop ( INFO_GROUP = 0, number of elements in INFO_GROUPS )
opt
[Name of INFO_GROUP == Name of HSP_ACC_GROUP]
loop ( HSP_ACC_GROUP = 0, number of elements in HSP_ACC_GROUPS )
loop ( X = 0, number of items in INFO_GROUP )
Perform access Y
Info from EPR for access Y
opt
[Match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X]
loop ( Y = 0, number of items in HSP_ACC_GROUP )
Info item X and info from EPR for 
access Y
opt [Info from EPR for access Y 
is the source of info item X]
KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO = KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + 1
Perform manual check to decide whether info from EPR for access Y is the source of info item X. 
Other possible sources are also considered during the check
Check whether there is a match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X
Fig. 22. The sequence diagram “Comparison of data”
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KILL-ACC-SC = (10 · (KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + 
KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC + KXR-ILL-ACC-SC))  ⁄  
Number of years since the monitoring started
Sensor
SCH-REG-MIS-SC
Fig. 23. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KILL-ACC-SC”
argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic key
indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 24 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC is updated each week. The
first thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-ILL-ACC” retrieves the value that was computed for
the basic key indicator in the previous week. Afterwards, the component counts for each of the lost/stolen smart
cards the number of accesses that have occurred between TIME 1 (the time the smart card’s owner used it the last
time before noticing that it was missing) and TIME 2 (the time when the smart card was registered as missing). In
the end, the component stores the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC, and sends it to “Component for calculating
KILL-ACC-SC,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 23.
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MIS_SC_LIST: All smart cards at Client H that were registered as 
missing in the period of one week backwards
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one 
week backwards to information in EPRs
Store KCH-ILL-ACC-SC
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC = ”The number of illegal accesses at Client H since the start of the monitoring up to the end 
of the previous week to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs from lost/stolen smart cards”
loop ( MIS_SC = 0, number of elements in MIS_SC_LIST )
Get the time TIME_1 for when the missing smart card MIS_SC was 
used the last time before its owner noticed that it was missing
Get the time TIME_2 for when the missing smart card MIS_SC was registered as missing and made unusable 
From ACC_LIST create ILL_ACC_HSP_LIST which is a list of all illegal accesses to highly sensitive and private info 
in EPRs that occurred between TIME_1 and TIME_2 from MIS_SC
loop ( ILL_ACC_HSP = 0, number of elements in ILL_ACC_HSP_LIST ) 
TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = 0
NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = 0
NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP + 1
TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP + NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC = KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP
Fig. 24. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-ILL-ACC-SC”
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Fig. 25. CORAS threat diagram providing a high-level overview of the impact of the proposed implementation of the monitoring infrastructure
for the different composite key indicators on the correctness of PBO-A8’
IX. EVALUATE CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
To evaluate whether the composite key indicators have construct validity, we re-do the risk analysis from Step
2.2 with the asset “Fulfillment of PBO-A8” replaced by the asset “Correctness of PBO-A8’.” We have established
that the monitoring infrastructure described in Step 2–4 is suitable for monitoring the relevant part of business.
With the designs of the key indicators specified in the previous step, we want to identify in this step whether the
proposed implementation of the monitoring infrastructure results in any new unacceptable risks. More precisely,
we want to identify unacceptable risks towards the correctness of the reformulated precise business objective that
are the result of threats to criteria for construct validity that the different composite key indicators need to fulfill.
We evaluate the construct validity of the composite key indicators based on the criteria given in Section III-F.
A high-level overview of the result of the risk analysis is given in the CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 25. In the
referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 26 – 30, risk to the correctness of the different composite key indicators have
been documented. For the key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO, Client H is of the opinion that their
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The key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are lower or higher than they should be
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Fig. 26. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are lower or higher than they should be,”
referred to in Fig. 25
correctness may be affected if the interval [0.1, 0.3] used to calculate the two key indicators is either too low or
too high. This is an example of violation of the stability criterion, since the selection of the interval is the result
of human decisions, i.e., expert judgments. For the two composite key indicators, no threats towards the definition
and instrument validity of the composite key indicators are identified.
In the case of the key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, Client H is of the opinion that its correctness may be
affected if the employees who classify unauthorized accesses as approved or not approved at X-ray and Blood test
analysis are incompetent and fraudulent, respectively. Both these cases are examples of violation of the stability
criterion, since the classification of unauthorized accesses as approved or not approved involves human decisions.
Moreover, Client H is worried that the sensor SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR (represented as a non-human threat in Fig. 27) may
be unstable with respect to logging of accesses to information in EPRs. This is an example of violation of the
instrument validity criterion. Besides the stability and instrument validity criteria, definition validity should also be
evaluated. In our case, we say that a key indicator has definition validity if its design is clear and unambiguous
so that the key indicator can be implemented correctly. The only thing that is not clear and unambiguous with
respect to the design of KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is how unauthorized accesses should be classified as approved or not
approved. Since this has already been covered during the evaluation of the stability criterion, we do not pursue this
issue further.
In the case of the key indicators KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO, Client H is worried that the correctness of
KSP-EPR-INFO may be affected if employees at Blood test analysis either fail to identify data leakages of sensitive
and private information from EPRs or incorrectly classify sensitive and private information obtained from EPRs
as the sources of data leakages, when no such data leakages have occurred. Moreover, Client H is worried that
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The key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 27. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
the correctness of KHSP-EPR-INFO may be affected if employees at X-ray commit the same errors when it comes
to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs. Both these cases are examples of violation of the stability
criterion. In the case of instrument validity, Client H is worried that the media retriever services employed by Blood
test analysis and X-ray are not able to collect the information necessary for detecting data leakages. Client H is also
worried that the two composite key indicators may violate the definition validity criterion. The design specifications
of the two composite key indicators are not clear and unambiguous with respect to how data leakages should be
identified. In both specifications, it is up to the employees investigating potential data leakages to decide. Since
this has already been covered during the evaluation of the stability criterion, we do not pursue this issue further.
In the case of the key indicator KILL-ACC-SC, Client H is worried that its correctness may be affected by health-
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The key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 28. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
care professionals not having a perfect recollection of when they used their smart cards the last time before losing
it. By not having a perfect recollection, accesses to information in EPRs may incorrectly be classified as legal or
illegal accesses. This is an example of violation of the stability criterion. For the composite key indicator, no threats
towards the definition and instrument validity of the composite key indicator are identified.
In Table XII the risks R19 – R30 have been plotted according to their likelihoods and consequences. As we can
see from the table, the two risks R26 and R28 are unacceptable. This means that all the composite key indicators
with the exceptions of KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO have construct validity. As a first step to making these two
risks acceptable, Client H finds it necessary to gain more knowledge on the suitability of the two media retriever
services. If the two risks do not become acceptable as a result of this, further treatment will be necessary in order
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The key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 29. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
for the two key indicators KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO to achieve construct validity. Such treatments may involve
replacing the media retriever services of Blood test analysis and X-ray, or introducing an additional media retriever
service for each of the two hospitals. In the latter case this means that Blood test analysis and X-ray will each
identify data leakages based on information which combines results from two media retriever services.
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The key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 30. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
TABLE XII
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE XI WITH THE RISKS R19 – R30 INSERTED
Likelihood























To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other method for the design of valid key indicators to monitor the
fulfillment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
There is a tool-framework called Mozart [23] that uses a model-driven approach to create monitoring applications
that employs key performance indicators. We do not focus on the implementation of key indicators, but we specify
what is needed for implementing them. The work in [23] also differs from our work by not designing indicators
from scratch, but by mining them from a data repository during the design cycle.
An important part of our method is the assessment of the validity of the key indicators we design. Our approach
to assessing validity is inspired by research conducted within the software engineering domain. As previously
explained, there is however no agreement upon what constitutes a valid software metric [8]. A number of the
software metrics validation approaches advocate the use of measurement theory [24][25][26] in the validation (see
e.g., [9][27][28]). Measurement theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is useful in measurement and data
analysis. The fundamental idea of this theory is that there is a difference between measurements and the attribute
being measured. Thus, in order to draw conclusions about the attribute, there is a need to understand the nature of the
correspondence between the attribute and the measurements. In [29], an approach that relies on measurement theory
for the validation of indicators is presented. This approach uses measurement theory to validate the meaningfulness
of IT security risk indicators.
Measurement theory has been criticized of being too rigid and restrictive in a practical measurement setting.
Briand et al. [27] advocate a pragmatic approach to measurement theory in software engineering. The authors
show that even if their approach may lead to violations of the strict prescriptions and proscriptions of measurement
theory, the consequences are small compared to the benefits. Another approach that takes a pragmatic approach to
measurement theory is [28]. Here, the authors propose a framework for evaluating software metrics. The applicability
of the framework is demonstrated by applying it on a bug count metric.
There exist also approaches that assess the validity of specific sets of key indicators. For instance, in [30] the
validity of indicators of firm technological capability is assessed, while the validity of indicators of patent value is
assessed in [31].
There are several approaches that focus on measuring the achievement of goals. One example is COBIT [32],
which is a framework for IT management and IT governance. The framework provides an IT governance model that
helps in delivering value from IT and understanding and managing the risks associated with IT. In the governance
model, business goals are aligned with IT goals, while metrics, in the form of leading and lagging indicators [33],
and maturity models are used to measure the achievement of the IT goals. In our approach we do not focus on the
value that the use of IT has with respect to the business objectives. On the other hand, the risk that the use of IT
has with respect to the business objectives is important. In our context, IT is relevant in the sense of providing the
infrastructure necessary for monitoring the part of business that needs to fulfill the business objectives. In Step 6
of our method we identify risks that may result from the use of the monitoring infrastructure with respect to the
business objectives.
Another way to measure the achievement of goals is by the use of the Goal-Question-Metric [34][35] (GQM)
approach. Even though GQM originated as an approach for measuring achievement in software development, it can
also be used in other contexts where the purpose is to measure achievement of goals. In GQM, business goals are
used to drive the identification of measurement goals. These goals do not necessarily measure the fulfillment of the
business goals, but they should always measure something that is of interest to the business. Each measurement
goal is refined into questions, while metrics are defined for answering each question. No specific method, beyond
reviews, is specified for validating whether the correct questions and metrics have been identified. The data provided
by the metrics are interpreted and analyzed with respect to the measurement goal in order to conclude whether it
is achieved or not. One of the main differences between our method and GQM is that we characterize precisely
what it means to achieve a goal/objective. In GQM, however, this may be a question of interpretation.
In the literature, key indicators are mostly referred to in the context of measuring business performance. There
exist numerous approaches to performance measurement. Some of these are presented in [36]. Regardless of the
approach being used, the organization must translate their business objectives/goals into a set of key performance
indicators in order to measure performance. An approach that is widely used [37] is balanced scorecard [5]. This
approach translates the company’s vision into four financial and non-financial perspectives. For each perspective a set
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of business objectives (strategic goals) and their corresponding key performance indicators are identified. However,
the implementation of a balanced scorecard is not necessarily straight forward. In [38], Neely and Bourne identify
several reasons for the failure of measurement initiatives such as balanced scorecards. One problem is that the
identified measures do not measure fulfillment of the business objectives, while another problem is that measures
are identified without putting much thought into how the data must be extracted in order to compute the measures.
The first problem can be addressed in Step 4 of our method, while the second problem can be addressed in Step
3 and Step 5 of our method. In Step 3 we identify the sensors to be deployed in the relevant part of business,
while in Step 5 we present the kinds of data that needs to be extracted from these sensors in order to compute the
measures.
Much research has been done in the field of data quality. The problem of data quality is also recognized within the
field of key indicators [39][40]. In [41] a survey on how data quality initiatives are linked with organizational key
performance indicators in Australian organizations is presented. This survey shows that a number of organizations
do not have data quality initiatives linked to their key indicators. Data quality should be taken into account when
designing key indicators, since the use of key indicators based on poor quality data may lead to bad business
decisions, which again may greatly harm the organization.
In [42][43] the problem of key indicators computed from uncertain events is investigated. The motivation for this
work is to understand the uncertainty of individual key indicators used in business intelligence. The authors use key
indicators based on data from multiple domains as examples. In these papers a model for expressing uncertainty is
proposed, and a tool for visualizing the uncertain key indicators is presented.
XI. CONCLUSION
In [1] we presented the method ValidKI (Valid Key Indicators) for designing key indicators to monitor the
fulfillment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
ValidKI facilitates the design of a set of key indicators that is valid with respect to a business objective. In this
report we have presented the improved and consolidated version of the method.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other method for the design of valid key indicators to monitor the
fulfillment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
The applicability of our method has been demonstrated on a large, realistic example case addressing the use of
electronic patient records in a hospital environment.
Even though ValidKI has been demonstrated on a large, realistic example case there is still a need to apply
ValidKI in a real-world industrial setting in order to evaluate properly to what extent it has the characteristics
specified in the introduction. By applying ValidKI in such a setting we will for instance gain more knowledge
regarding whether it is time and resource efficient.
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